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UNITED STATES v. ARMSTRONG
48 E3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
FACTS
In Armstrong I,I the United States appealed the dismissal of indictments against defendants Christopher
Armstrong, Aaron Hampton, Freddie Mack, Shelton
Martin, and Robert Rozelle. The indictments were dismissed as a sanction for the United States' failure to comply with a discovery order issued by District Court Judge
Consuelo Bland Marshall. In April 1992, the defendants
were charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine base
(commonly known as "crack") a federal offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846. Some of the defendants were
also charged with selling cocaine base under 21 U.S.C.
§841(a)(1) and using firearms in connection with drug
trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924 (c).
The charges against the defendants resulted from
an investigation by a joint task force of detectives from
the Inglewood Narcotics Division and agents from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). The
investigation led to the subsequent arrest of defendants
for possessing close to 135 grams of cocaine base and
multiple firearms.
Defendants Martin, Armstrong and the other three
defendants sought discovery and / or a dismissal of the
indictments for selective prosecution, alleging that they
were prosecuted in federal court because of their race To
support the motion of discovery in the federal district court,
the defendants offered a survey by the Federal Public
Defender's office showing that in every case prosecuted
under Sections 841 and 846, the defendants were black.
The United States was unable to provide an explanation
for the disparity in the numbers, but insisted that there
was no racial motivation in the charging decisions. The
district court disagreed and granted the defendants' motion for discovery, ordering the United States to:
(1) provide a list of all cases from the prior three
years in which the government charged both cocaine base offenses and firearm offenses; (2) identify the race of the defendants in those cases; (3)
identify whether state, federal, or joint law enforcement authorities investigated each case; and (4)
explain the criteria used by the U.S. Attorney's Office for deciding whether to bring cocaine base cases
2
to the federal court.
121 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir.
1995) [hereinafter "ArmstrongII"].
2

The United States filed a motion for reconsideration of the discovery order. In support of its motion, the
United States provided a list of all defendants charged
with violation of Sections 841 and 846 over a three year
period without any racial breakdown. The United States
also provided declarations by three law enforcement officers and two Assistant United States Attorneys, who
collectively gave four explanations for the racial disparity in the government's charging decisions:
(1) Socio-economic factors result in more racial
groups being involved in the distribution of certain
drugs and blacks are the most active in the LosAngeles crack area; (2) over a three-year period
seven non-black, but racial minority defendants were
prosecuted on federal cocaine base charges; (3) many
blacks have been tried in state court for cocaine base
offenses; and (4) the factors used by federal prosecutors to base their charging decisions are unidentified "race-neutral" criteria.'
In support of the district court's discovery decision,
the defendants added to their original statistical study
by submitting additional declarations and an article from
the Los Angeles Times. One of the declarations was from
a halfway house intake coordinator, who reported that
in his experience whites and blacks dealt and used cocaine base in equal numbers. In a separate declaration, a
defense attorney stated that in his experience many nonblacks4were prosecuted for cocaine base offenses in state
court.

District Court Judge Consuelo Bland Marshall denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that because the statistical data raised a question about the
motivation of the government, the United States must
disdose its criteria for the charging decision. The United
States refused to comply with the discovery order and
the defendants moved for dismissal of the indictments
as a sanction for the violation of the discovery order.
The district court dismissed the indictments, but stayed
the order pending appeal.The government appealed the
district court's decision to dismiss the indictments as a
sanction for the government's failure to obey the discovery order.

3Id.

4 Id.

at 1512.

The Ninth Circuit held inArmstronglthatthe proper
standard to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution
claim was the "colorable basis" standard as articulated in
United States v. Bourgeois.5 Bourgeoisheld that "a defendant must present specific facts, not mere allegations,
establish a colorable basis for the existence of both discriminatory application of a law and discriminatory intent on the part of the government."6 Armstrong I was
reviewed en banc by the Ninth Circuit in Armstrong 1I.7
HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed en
banc the district court's dismissal of the indictments.
Although the court adopted the Bourgeois colorable
basis standard, the court emphasized that the threshold for discovery is much lower than the colorable
basis standard applied in Bourgeois. The court expressly overruled United States v. Guiterrez,9 which
had held that statistical disparity alone does not satisfy the discriminatory effect prong of a primafade
showing of selective prosecution. 10 The Armstrong II
court held that because the threshold showing for discovery is less than that for a prima fade case, then
"inadequately explained evidence of a significant statistical disparity suffices to show the colorable basis
of discriminatory intent and effect which warrants
discovery on a selective prosecution claim.""
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
The court in Armstrong II resolved a conflict within
the the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals between two
cases that adopted different approaches to the threshold discovery showing required of a defendant in a selective prosecution claim. Both United States v. Redondo13
Lemosl 2 and Bourgeois follow United States v. Wayte.
Wayte held that selective prosecution claims should be
reviewed according to ordinary equal protection standards,14 and required a petitioner to show both discriminatory effect and motive. 5 Bourgeois noted that Wayte
did not establish a discovery threshold. 6
In dictum, the Redondo- Lemos court suggested that
in selective prosecution claims, the defendant must
5964 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
6 United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir.
1992).
748 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).

s964 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
s990 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1993).
10 Armstrong I, 48 F.3d 1514 C1995).
" Id. at 1513.
12 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992).
13470 U.S. 598 (1985).
'4 Id. at 608.
'1Id. at 608-609.
16Bourgeois, 964 F.2d at 939.

present enough evidence to demonstrate a reasonable
inference of discriminatory treatment. 7 The court in
Redondo-Lemos held that in order to establish purposeful discrimination, the district court may find an
intent to discriminate on the part of the prosecutor
on the basis of its own day-to-day observations.' If
the defendant raises the claim of selective prosecution, enough evidence must be presented to demonstrate a reasonable inference of-discriminatory intent. 9 Once a showing of discriminatory effect has
been made, the United States must be given an opportunity to present evidence to rebut the prima fade case.20 This evidence consists of "overall case statistics" which both the district court and the defen2
dant might reasonably understand and analyze. ' If
the district court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecutor's charging or plea bargaining practice has a discriminatory impact, it must determine whether the prosecution was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.22 At this point, an in camera
review of certain prosecution files and limited discovery by the defendant might be allowed, 23 but such
an examination is only to be conducted in extraordinary situations and only when the district court has
serious doubts about whether the prosecutorial decisions are being made in a discriminatory fashion. 4
Finally, the Redondo-Lemos court held that if the district court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that there has been intentional discrimination on the
basis of a race or sex, then it may fashion the appro25
priate remedy.
In Bourgeois,the defendant raised the issue of selective prosecution. The court held that a defendant must
"present specific facts, not mere allegations, which establish a colorable basis for the existence of both discriminatory application of a law and discriminatory intent on the part of government actors."26 The court explicitly stated that this standard contained a high threshold.27 However, the Bourgeois court held that the
"colorable basis" standard for discovery should not be so
28
high as to require establishment of a primafacie case.
The preliminary issue before the Ninth Circuit in
Armstrong I was whether the Redondo-Lemos "reasonable inference "showing or the Bourgeois"colorable ba17Redondo-Lemos, 955
'

8

F.2d 1296 (1992).

Id.at 1302.

19 Id.

0 Id.
21Id.

2 Id.
3 Id.

24

25

Id.

Id.

26Id.
27

28

Id.

Bourgeois,964 F.2d 939 (1992).The First, Second, Fifth,

and Eighth Circuits have adopted the "primafade showing"

sis" showing was the appropriate standard in determining when a defendant has made a proper showing to
obtain discovery in a selective prosecution claim. The
Ninth Circuit's holding in Armstrong 129 resulted in the
court adopting Bourgeois' colorable basis standard.30The
Armstrong I court admitted that neither test was "easily
susceptible to further definition,"31 but determined that
the colorable basis test of Bourgeois was more aligned
with the facts in Armstrong L31 In both Bourgeois and
Armstrong, the defendants were challenging their prosecutions, while in Redondo-Lemos the judge granted discovery based on his own suspicions.The ArmstrongI court
held that "Bourgeois is the law of [the Ninth Circuit]
regarding the test for determining whether to grant a
defendant's motion for discovery on a selective prosecu3
tion claim.
The Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear Armstrong I en
banc, in order to clarify the meaning of the "colorable
basis" standard. The court rejected Bourgeois' "high
threshold" characterization of the colorable basis standard.34The ArmstrongIIcourt held that the'"high threshold" language appears to set an artificially onerous burden on selective prosecution discovery daims.35 The court
stressed that such a reading of the colorable basis standard was erroneous and that the
threshold is not as 'high"
36
as the language in Bourgeois.
Second, the court recognized that Bourgeois did not
adequately explain the proper showing needed under
the colorable basis threshold to prove that prosecutorial
conduct has a discriminatory effect and is motivated by
a discriminatory purpose.37 In order for a defendant to
succeed on a claim of selective prosecution, the defendant must show that the prosecutor's selection "had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpos' 38 The Armstrongllcourt stated that
a direct showing of discriminatory intent is not always
necessary to prove a claim, and that in some situations a
39
circumstantial showing of intent may be used.
Armstrong11 found that"a circumstantial showing of in-

tent may be based on evidence of discriminatory effects,"40 and held that in some situations statistical disparities alone were sufficient to provide evidence of discriminatory effect and intent.41 This holding expressly
overrules Guirerrez.The court'in Armstrong II concluded
that "inadequately explained evidence of a significant
statistical disparity in the race of those prosecuted suffices to show the colorable basis of discriminatory intent and effect that42 warrants discovery on a selective
prosecution claim."
Finally, the ArmstrongIf court recognized that Bourgeois did not adequately emphasize the evidentiary problems that the defendants face in attempting to prove a
colorable basis claim of selective prosecution. 43The court
advised district court judges who are considering a discovery request to seriously consider the evidentiary obstacles defendants face. 44 Due to the broad discretion
afforded to prosecutors in their charging decisions, it is
entirely possible that the prosecutors possess45the only
information that would prove discrimination.
Defendants attempting to make a colorable basis
showing of selective prosecution are expected only to
put forth evidence that is already in their possession or
to make "good faith" efforts to obtain readily available
evidence.46 Defendants are not required to present sophisticated analyses or to compile facts which are not
easily obtainable by them. 7 The court concluded that
the colorable basis standard "ensures that the governmert will not be called to answer for its charging decisions as a result of frivolous and unwarranted allegations."48 The court found that the colorable basis standard provides the government with sufficient protection against judicial scrutiny of their charging decisions.
'At the same time, the standard ensures that defendants
will not face unjustified hurdles at the discovery stage
that will predude them from demonstrating the existence of actual discrimination in the selection of defendants for criminal prosecution."49

threshold to discovery. Under this doctrine the defendants must
establish a primafaciecase of selective prosecution before discovery of materials requested in connection with the claim
can be compelled. United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844 (8th
Cir. 1994). If the defendant fails to establish a primafacieshowing, the prosecution is presumed to be constitutionally valid
and undertaken in good faith. Id. at 846. In order for a defendant to make a prima facie showing of selective prosecution,
the defendant must show; (1) that he has been singled out for
prosecution while others similarly situated have not been prosecuted for similar conduct and (2) that the government's action in thus singling him out was based on an impermissible
motive such as race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional

33
1d. at 1436.
34Armstrongl,

rights. Id.

46

29 21 E3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1994).
30

Armstrong I, 21 F.3d at 1436.

31 Id.
32

Id.

48 F3d at 1513.

3S Id.
36

1d.

37 Id.

Id. at 1513 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608).
39Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1513 - 1514.
43
1d. at 1514.
"Id.
45 Id.
38
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48 Id. at
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1515.

Applying the Bourgeois "colorable basis" test, the
ArmstrongII court found that the "defendants have presented sufficient evidence to provide a colorable basis
for believing that the government has engaged in discriminatory prosecution."s The court also found that
the defendant's statistical evidence, based on a study
conducted by the Federal Public Defender's office and
which suggested that blacks are disproportionately
charged with federal crack offense combined with the
United States' inability to offer sufficient evidence to
refute the inference in response, was sufficient for the
district judge in her discretion to determine that a
colorable basis for selective prosecution had been
shown.5
The court distinguished the study conducted by the
Federal Public Defender from the evidence used by the
defendants in Bourgeois.52 In Bourgeois, the defendants
had argued that they were entitled to discovery based
on a showing that all prosecutions for firearm violations
resulting from a two-day police operation involved only
black defendants. s3 The district court rejected these
claims on the theory that two days was too short of time
to serve as a basis for showing discriminatory intent and
effect.s4 In contrast, the Federal Public Defender study
presented by the defendants in Armstrong, involved an
agency that represents a significant percentage of all federal defendants and covered a significant period of time ss
Such a study "provides a much stronger basis for reasonably inferring invidious discrimination than 5does
an
6
analysis of only a single, short police operation."
The court cautioned district courts to afford the
United States an opportunity to explain the evidence
offered by the defendant.5 7 'A colorable basis must still
exist after all the evidence presented by both sides has
been considered."I s The court found that two declarations from defense attorneys provided additional support for the defendant's allegations that the prosecutor's
charging decisions were discriminatory 9
Judge Wallace concurred in the judgment of the
court, but was concerned about the majority's attempts
to "clarify" the test stated in Bourgeois.6°JudgeWallace
agreed with the majority's rejection of the "high threshold" requirement of Bourgeois,"' but disagreed that the
standard was as "low" as a nonfrivolous showing.6Judge

Wallace also disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that statistical evidence might be sufficient to prove discriminatory effect and intent. 61Judge Wallace conceded,
however, that at the discovery stage, where there is
enough data over a sufficient amount of time, such evidence is sufficient to establish a colorable basis claim for
selective prosecution.r 4
Judge Wallace pointed out that the role of the appellate court is not to second-guess the trial court, but
to ask whether the district court abused its
discretion.65Unless. the district court clearly abused its
discretion in ordering discovery and dismissing the indictments, the judgment of the lower court should not
be overturned on appeal. He found that in this case, the
defendants provided sufficient evidence to support the
district court's order and that therefore the lower court's
decision should be affirmed.
Judge Rymer, along with Judges Leavy, Nelson, and
Kleinfeld dissented.66 They argued that a colorable basis
had not been established.67 To show a colorable basis,
the dissent asserted that the defendants must: (1) draw
a reference to a comparison group, and (2) provide evidence that others, similarly situated except for their race,
have not been prosecuted.68 Judge Rymer asserted that
the majority's opinion actually "guts Bourgeois by holding that when a selective prosecution claim is based on
race, evidence tending to show that only members of
racial or ethnic minority groups have been prosecuted
will suffice."OJudge Rymer argued that "the proper legal
standard is not whether the defendant's evidence raises
a question, but whether it provides a colorable basis for
the existence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent."0 In the absence of any evidence that the
government purposefully selected these defendants for
prosecution on account of their race, there is no colorable
basis for the
existence of discriminatory intent as a mat7
ter of law.

Id. (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 Id. at 1521 (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).

50

Id. at 1515.

61

52

Id.

61

51 Id.

1

The dissent asserted that at the discovery stage, it is
the defendant's burden to provide facts that would prove
both discriminatory intent and effect. 72 The dissent complained that the district court erred in two respects: (1)
it shifts to the government the responsibility to dissuade
public opinion, but ignored the government's submissions, and (2) the discovery ordered will not show who

Id. (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).

53Id.

65 Id. (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).

4 Id.

" Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).

55Id.

67 Id. at 1522 (Rymer, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1516.
s1Id. at 1517.

68 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 1524 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
71 id.
72 Id.

5

58 Id.

5

9Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1520 (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 Id. (Wallace, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
60

was not prosecuted, but only those defendants that were
prosecuted.73
Additionally, the dissent argued that both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
have clearly distinguished between discriminatory effect
and intent, thus recognizing them as two distinct elements. 74 The dissent argued that "the majority's opinion
effectively collapses intent into effect by holding that
both75 must be shown by the same, insubstantial statistic."

The dissent objected most vigorously to the
majority's removal of the "high threshold" standard of
Bourgeois.76 Judge Rymer argued that "a high threshold
will discourage fishing expeditions, protect legitimate
prosecutoral discretion, safeguard government investigative records, and yet still allow meritorious claims to
proceed."T'Judge Rymer argued that lowering the threshold requirement will allow frivolous claims against law
enforcement to flourish 7 8 and that a "high threshold" is
necessary because courts are ill equipped to evaluate a
prosecutor's charging decision. 9 In essence, Judge Rymer
warned that allowing such claims could result in a separation of powers issue. Judge Rymer also characterized
the majority's attempts to clarify the "colorable basis"
standard as crafting a "new standard which is far more
elusive than Bourgeois."°

CONCLUSION

Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have also
adopted the "colorable basis" standard for discovery in
selective prosecution claims. In these circuits, the
colorable basis standard is met by "some evidence tending to show the essential elements of the claim....,s8
"[S] ome evidence" means the showing must be more
than frivolous and based on more than conclusory allegations. 2 The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other
hand, have adopted the "nonfrivolous/ legitimate issue"
threshold for discovery in selective prosecution cases.
This standard requires a defendant to present "sufficient
evidence to establish a 'colorable entitlement' for a selective prosecution claim or sufficient facts 'to take the
question past the frivolous state and raise a reasonable
doubt as to the prosecutor's purpose."83 There is some
uncertainty in the circuits applying the colorable basis
standard about where the nonfrivolous! legitimate-issue threshold lies in the discovery continuum. The Seventh Circuit has lumped both the frivolous/legitimateissue threshold with the primafacie threshold and criticized both as being too high.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
ArmstrongI.84 Thus the status of the colorable basis standard as articulated in Arnstrong II is uncertain. The disagreement between the majority of the Ninth Circuit
who want to protect against discriminatory enforcement
of the laws, and the dissent who want to protect the law
enforcement from frivolous selective prosecution claims
will eventually be resolved by the High Court.

Other circuits have adopted their own tests to determine whether or not a defendant is allowed discovery in a selective prosecution claim. The Third, Sixth,
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7 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 1522 (Rymer, J., dissenting).

82 Armstrong l, 48 F.3d at 1512, (quoting United States v.
Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990)(emphasis is

7sId.
(Rymer, J.,
dissenting).
76 Id. at 1526 (Rymer, J.,
dissenting).

original)).

71Id.

(Rymer, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
79Id. (Rymer, J.,
dissenting).

10 Id. at 1526 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
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